2011 - CRS Report on Nuclear Surface Ships (CGN(X))

This is the Congressional Research Report by Ronald O'Rourke issued in 2011. The 2011 CRS report is essentially an updated version of the 2008 CRS report, but the policy context had changed significantly. The 2008 report examined nuclear-powered surface ships as an active, near-term decision because the Navy was then planning the CG(X) cruiser and Congress was considering whether that class should use nuclear propulsion. It discussed the possibility that long-lead nuclear components for a nuclear CG(X) might need funding soon if the first ship were procured in FY2011.

By contrast, the 2011 report is more retrospective and less urgent. The Navy’s FY2011 budget had proposed canceling the CG(X) program and instead building improved conventionally powered Arleigh Burke-class destroyers. CRS therefore concluded that cancellation of CG(X) left no apparent near-term shipbuilding opportunity for expanding nuclear propulsion to surface ships other than aircraft carriers.

Most of the underlying analysis did not change. Both reports rely on the same 2005 Naval Reactors quick-look analysis and the same 2006 Navy alternative propulsion study. Both retain the central findings that nuclear propulsion would add about $600 million to $800 million to the procurement cost of a surface combatant or amphibious ship, but could become life-cycle cost competitive for a medium-size surface combatant if oil averaged roughly $70 to $225 per barrel, depending on ship operating tempo.

The 2011 report also updates several factual and legislative points. It notes that the Navy’s carrier force had become entirely nuclear-powered after the retirement of USS Kitty Hawk in 2009, whereas the 2008 report still described the carrier force as nearly, but not yet, all nuclear-powered. It also adds FY2010 and FY2011 legislative history, including continued House interest in an all-nuclear battle force and discussion of research into smaller reactors or alternative reactor concepts suitable for destroyer-sized ships.

In short, the 2008 report framed nuclear surface ships as a live acquisition choice tied to CG(X). The 2011 report preserved the same technical and cost analysis but reframed the issue as a longer-term policy question, because the CG(X) program had slipped and was being canceled.