2008 - CRS Report on Nuclear Surface Ship Considerations (CGN(X))

This Congressional Research Service paper on "Navy Nuclear-Powered Surface Ships: Background, Issues, and Options for Congress”. It was authored by Ronald O'Rourke and published in May 2008.

The report examines whether the Navy should expand nuclear propulsion beyond submarines and aircraft carriers to future major surface combatants, especially the planned **CG(X) cruiser**. Congress had already shown interest in this direction: Section 1012 of the FY2008 Defense Authorization Act made it U.S. policy to build major Navy combatants with integrated nuclear power unless the Secretary of Defense determined that doing so was not in the national interest.

The central tradeoff is **higher procurement cost versus potential operational and life-cycle benefits**. A 2006 Navy study found that nuclear propulsion would add roughly **$600 million to $800 million** to the procurement cost of a surface combatant or amphibious ship. However, nuclear ships would avoid petroleum fuel costs and could become life-cycle cost competitive depending on oil prices and operating tempo. For a medium-size surface combatant, the study estimated break-even oil prices of roughly **$70 to $225 per barrel**, depending on usage.

Operationally, the report emphasizes that nuclear-powered surface combatants could surge rapidly to distant theaters, remain on station longer, and avoid the operational interruptions and logistics vulnerabilities associated with at-sea refueling. This was especially relevant for a high-power future cruiser with advanced radar and ballistic missile defense missions.

The report also reviews the Navy’s prior experience with nuclear surface combatants. The Navy built **nine nuclear-powered cruisers**, beginning with **USS Long Beach**, but stopped after the 1970s largely because of procurement cost concerns. Later Aegis cruiser concepts using nuclear power were rejected in favor of the smaller conventionally powered **Ticonderoga-class** design.

Key issues for Congress included cost, shipyard capacity, nuclear-component industrial base effects, maintenance and repair infrastructure, training enough nuclear-qualified sailors, limits on foreign port access or forward homeporting, and environmental considerations. The report notes that only certain shipyards were nuclear-certified, especially Newport News and Electric Boat, and that restarting nuclear capability at other surface-combatant yards would require substantial investment.

Overall, the report does not recommend a single answer. It frames nuclear-powered surface ships as potentially attractive for **large, high-end, high-operational-tempo combatants** like CG(X), but only if Congress judged the operational benefits and fuel-price hedge sufficient to justify the higher up-front shipbuilding cost.