2003 NASA NAVY Benchmarking Exchange Vol 2 Report

The NASA/Navy Benchmarking Exchange (NNBE) was undertaken to identify practices and procedures and to share lessons learned in the Navy’s submarine and NASA’s human space flight programs. The NNBE focus is on safety and mission assurance policies, processes, accountability, and control measures.

This is Volume 2 of the report which addresses NR Safety Culture.

In August 2002, a team was formed, co-chaired by senior representatives from the NASA Office of Safety and Mission Assurance and the NAVSEA 07Q Submarine Safety and Quality Assurance Division. During the first phase of activity July -December 2002, the NASA team closely examined the Navy submarine safety (SUBSAFE) program. Information gathered during this first phase of the benchmarking was reported in the NNBE Interim Report of December 20, 2002.

In January 2003, the benchmarking exchange continued with a visit by NAVSEA to Kennedy Space Center and with several NASA visits to NAVSEA 08 Naval Reactors (NR). This progress report summarizes further NASA observations concerning the Navy submarine program with focus on the Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program. (Note: The abbreviation "NR" is used throughout this document to represent both the Naval Reactors organization and the Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program)

NASA’s examination resulted in identification of the following key leadership, organizational, and management attributes of NR safety implementation.

- NR has total programmatic and safety responsibility for the design, fabrication, test, installation, operation, and maintenance of all U. S. Navy nuclear propulsion plants.

- NR represents a very stable program based on long-term relationships with three prime contractors and a relatively small number of critical suppliers and vendors.

- NR employs well-documented, conservative and achievable technical requirements whose implementation is verified through robust audit and review processes.

- NR is a relatively flat organization with quick and assured access to the NR Director

- Critical NR program decisions require concurrence of all appropriate system, component, and support technical managers in addition to the program manager.

- NR has embedded the safety process within its organization such that safety and quality assurance are mainstreamed to an extent that a quality or safety office per se is unnecessary.

- NR relies upon recruiting, training, and retaining highly qualified people who are held personally accountable and responsible for safety.

- The theme of recurrent training is a major element of the NR safety culture and NR incorporates extensive outside experience to build a safety training regimen that has become a major component of the NR safety record.

- NR promotes the airing of diverse and differing opinions and recognizes that when no differing opinions are present it is the responsibility of management to ensure critical examination of an issue to actively encourage such opinions.

- NR has institutionally embedded a closed-loop lessons learned process that begins with a technical requirements base built on 5400 years of reactor operational experience, which in turn provides the foundation for the next generation propulsion plant design specifications.

The following opportunities are identified for NASA to consider based on the benchmarking:

- Increase the capability and functions of current NASA engineering organizations.

- Strengthen independent safety analysis and compliance assurance organizations.

- Consider alternative approaches for safety critical decision making, including enhanced roles for independent technical and safety organizations.

- Consider alternative organizational/management approaches for future human space flight programs

- Employ selected Navy submarine approaches to create stronger NASA system safety performance, including system safety training, alternative fora for discussion of safety critical engineering issues and the airing of differing opinions, as well as verification of safety behavior.

- Implement a Process Sponsor Program to enhance the retention of corporate knowledge and strengthen critical material and manufacturing processes.