2003 Bowman Testimony House Committee on Science

On October 29, 2003, Admiral Bowman testified before the House Committee on Science concerning the Columbia accident and NR's safety culture.

Admiral Frank L. Bowman, Director of the Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program, was invited to testify regarding NASA’s culture and safety procedures in the wake of the Space Shuttle Columbia accident on February 1, 2003. His role was not to provide technical or investigative insight into the accident itself, but to offer perspective on the Naval Reactors Program’s safety culture, which has maintained a flawless operational record over decades of nuclear-powered operations.

Key Points:

1. Culture of Responsibility and Accountability:

   • Bowman emphasized the strong organizational culture within Naval Reactors, marked by individual responsibility, rigorous training, and strict accountability.

   • Every decision, even minor, is scrutinized for safety implications.

   • Leaders are expected to take personal ownership of outcomes, and this culture is instilled at all levels.

2. Technical Rigor and Conservative Decision-Making:

   • The program's technical processes are grounded in conservative design, thorough review, and disciplined execution.

   • Uncertainties are not dismissed but investigated, and “gut feelings” are respected and explored.

3. Integrated Technical Authority:

   • There is a clear line of technical authority, with decisions centralized to avoid ambiguity in safety responsibility.

   • Unlike some distributed models (as seen in NASA), Naval Reactors maintains centralized, accountable leadership in both engineering and operations.

4. Organizational Structure:

   • Bowman described a tight integration between design, construction, operations, and oversight—all under one authority.

   • This ensures feedback loops between operations and design, and no disconnect between technical insight and leadership action.

5. Continuous Vigilance and Learning:

   • The system is characterized by constant self-assessment, auditing, and independent review.

   • Mistakes and near-misses are treated as opportunities to learn, not to assign blame.

6. Personnel Selection and Training:

   • Personnel undergo intensive screening, followed by rigorous and continuous training.

   • Individuals are expected to speak up when something seems wrong—creating a "safety-conscious work environment."

7. Potential Application to NASA:

   • Bowman suggested that NASA may benefit from adopting some of the organizational and cultural practices of Naval Reactors.

   • He refrained from prescribing a direct solution but emphasized that centralized authority, clear accountability, and a conservative safety culture are foundational to long-term success in high-risk technological domains.

Text of Speech:

Statement of Admiral F. L. “Skip” Bowman, U.S. Navy

Director, Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program

Before the House Committee on Science

29 October 2003

Mr. Chairman and members of this committee, thank you for giving me the opportunity to testify today on the subject of the culture of safety that has allowed Naval Reactors to be successful for the last 55 years.

But first, let me say that that I wish the circumstances that brought me here were different. Obviously, the underlying reason I’m here involves your oversight of NASA in the aftermath of the space shuttle Columbia tragedy. I want to begin, then, by extending my sympathy to all the families, colleagues, and friends of the Columbia crew. I must also tell you that although there has been and continues to be much public discussion of the tragedy—why it happened, what changes NASA should pursue, and others—I do not know first-hand the details surrounding the accident, nor am I an expert on spacecraft or the NASA organization. I therefore am not qualified to make judgments about the causes of the tragedy or to suggest changes that NASA may implement to prevent our Nation from suffering another terrible loss. However, having studied the final report of the Columbia Accident Investigation Board, I believe you may draw some useful conclusions from my testimony.

My area of expertise is the Naval Reactors Program (NR), so it’s better for me to talk about that. Admiral Hyman G. Rickover set up NR in 1948 to develop nuclear propulsion for naval warships. Nuclear propulsion is vital to the Navy today for the reasons Admiral Rickover envisioned 55 years ago: it gives our warships high speed, virtually unlimited endurance, worldwide mobility, and unmatched operational flexibility. When applied to our submarines, nuclear propulsion also enables the persistent stealth that allows these warships to operate undetected for long periods in hostile waters, exercising their full range of capabilities.

In 1982, after almost 34 years as the Director of Naval Reactors, Admiral Rickover retired. Recognizing the importance of preserving the authority and responsibilities Admiral Rickover had established, President Reagan signed Executive Order 12344. The provisions of the executive order were later set forth in Public Laws 98-525 [1984] and 106-65 [1999]. The executive order and laws require that the Director, Naval Reactors, hold positions of decision-making authority within both the Navy and the Department of Energy (DOE). Because continuity and stature are vital, the director has the rank of four-star admiral within the Navy and Deputy Administrator within the Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration and a tenure of 8 years.

Through the Executive Order and these laws, the director has responsibility for all aspects of naval nuclear propulsion, specifically:

• Direct supervision of our single-purpose DOE laboratories, the Expended Core Facility, and our training reactors.

• Research, development, design, acquisition, procurement, specification, construction, inspection, installation, certification, testing, overhaul, refueling, operating practices and procedures, maintenance, supply support, and ultimate disposition of naval nuclear propulsion plants and components, plus any related special maintenance and service facilities.

• Training (including that which is conducted at the DOE training reactors), assistance and concurrence in the selection, training, qualification, and assignment of personnel reporting to the director and of personnel who supervise, operate, or maintain naval nuclear propulsion plants.

• Oversight of the more than 100 nuclear-powered ships and over 500 reactor plants built and operated since the program began. These ships operate with unmatched safety and performance records.

The success of Naval Reactors is not due to chance. The program works as well as it does because of the culture of excellence and responsibility created and maintained since its founding. Safety is ingrained in the organization’s philosophy, personnel, technical approach, management methods, and oversight. We focus on accountability, personal responsibility, technical competence, conservatism in decision-making, and an unrelenting attention to detail. This discipline is applied to every aspect of design, construction, operation, and maintenance.

A critical element in our success is the clear, centralized authority and accountability for all aspects of the program. All lines of communication and decision-making flow through the director. Everyone in the chain of command is responsible, and we work hard to ensure those responsibilities are clearly understood and executed. We don’t wait for things to go wrong before acting. Instead, we focus on identifying problems early and resolving them quickly.

We rigorously self-assess. We conduct audits, reviews, and inspections, with emphasis on objectivity. These are not just box-checking exercises but meaningful efforts to maintain our high standards. Anyone at any level is encouraged—and expected—to raise concerns. We value and act on “gut feelings” or subtle signs of trouble before they become actual problems.

Another key is training. Our personnel are selected and trained to exacting standards. Operators must be qualified and continually re-qualified. The high demands we place on our people require a long-term commitment to education, discipline, and professionalism.

I would like to conclude by saying that the culture of safety and success at Naval Reactors is the result of a deliberate, integrated, and long-standing effort. It’s not something that can be implemented overnight or simply through directives. It requires consistent leadership, unwavering standards, and deep personal commitment from everyone involved. I believe that in the wake of the Columbia tragedy, organizations across our government and industry can draw lessons from the Naval Reactors Program’s experience.

Thank you.