1994 - The Rickover Way on Executing a Major Program

These are 73 principles put together by William "Bill" Wegner (NRHQ 1956 - 1979 and Deputy Director (1964 - 1979) for executing a major DOD/DOE program. These were provided to NR-HA by Alan Newhouse (NRHQ 1960 - 1992). A text version is available here.

THE RICKOVER WAY

or

Do's and Don'ts on Executing a Major DOD/DOE Program 

(Not necessarily in order of importance) ·

As interpreted by William Wegner, November 1994

Part I

1. The program must not be inherently unpopular with the general public. Today, a DoD nuclear­ powered space program would not fly, nor would attempting to dispose of high level nuclear

waste by launching into outer space.

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2. Major programs can't be done under a cloak of secrecy. Manhattan Project concepts are no longer acceptable to anyone.

3. Don't depend on technical expertise within the Navy or DoE, either military or civilian to accomplish the work. Director selects a few strong (technically and managerial) from his own personal knowledge--then "grow" others. Need some military officers to give the program the correct image and interplay.

4. Must have Congressional support (lots of it, strong and lasting). Don't pin hopes on one or two members. Don't forget the staff. Today, they are as important as the members.

5. Strong DoD/Navy support is helpful but don't count on it. Same is true of the Administration-­ they are all too transient.

6. Director stay out of politics--be·neither·a Republican nor a Democrat.

7. Director must be a strong individual with a long tenure to do the job. He must have or develop a high degree of credibility with Congress and the public.

8. Don't look to the contractors to garner Congressional/Administration support. Director tells them to stay out unless and until he indicates otherwise.

9. Don't let the contractors take control, technically or otherwise.

10. Where possible, get separate funding support from other federal agencies.

11. Don't divide the turf. Keep the Director in total control.

12. Keep the academic community out.

13. Know when to cut off the scientists and move in the engineers.

14. Control all funding. Maintain a tight fiscal program with strong oversight.  Don't trust contractors to do it for you.

15. Develop a small cadre of highly technical people, willing to stay for the total program. They must all be people the Director can trust. These will be the technical managers.

16. Get "exempted" status from OPM for people working for the Director.

17. Don't restrict the program to one contractor. Where possible, pit one contractor against the other on technical issues.

18. Don't rely on government labs for anything unless the Director fully controls them.

19. Don't let contractor(s) be the sole provider of hardware. They may be the purchaser but

only with heavy oversight.

20. Director must be involved with the entire program, not just the development phase.

21. Don't allow programs to get enmeshed in cyclic management fads such as TQM (total quality management).  Avoid involvement with "high level" Boards.

22. To the extent possible, don't get involved with studies made by the NAS (National Academy of Science) or other so-called groups of experts.

23. Don't oversell the program or promise anything (technically, fiscally, performance or schedulewise). Let results speak.

24. Don't try to sell your program through the media.

25. Develop, execute and control the entire life-cycle program (maintenance/repair, people,

parts, facilities, equipment, procedures, testing, etc).

26. Exercise strong operational oversight. Maintain final authority on go-no-go situations.

27. Control responses to all media inquiries.

28. Develop and use the "pink" system.  Read all outgoing--no incoming.

29. Don't try to fool Congress.

30. Don't be afraid to tell your "superiors" what you really believe. Bad news is bad news--a bum idea is a bum idea.

31. Don't ever try to defy the laws of nature. There are no such things as "scientific breakthroughs" that will change the laws of nature.

32. Don't put too many untried "things" into the program.  There will always be pressure to

do this, and it will be unpopular to go against it.

33. Develop a resistance to believing people when they tell you how great you are – mostly contractors.

34. Develop multiple sources of information.

35. Don't become emotionally involved with anyone who works for you or in the program.

36. Be willing to work 80 hours a week, 7 days a week, and no vacations.

37. Be willing to call on anyone, anywhere if you feel that person can solve your problem.

38. Don't rely on codes (ASME, etc) or MilSpecs as they generalJy don't apply to developing technology.

39. Be willing to pay top dollar for top talent.

40. Control the selection and training of the people who will operate the thing you are·making.

41. Technical problems need not be solved "immediately"--personnel problems must be.

42. Learn to differentiate between a "technical" problem and a "political" problem. Both must be resolved, but don't get them mixed up.

43. Accept the fact that people (operators) will make mistakes.  Account for it in the design.

44. Keep it simple (NSS Savannah).

45. Training your people is critical to the success of the program.

46. Don't confuse loyalty and technical competence. Ferret out those who always agree with you and get rid of them.

47. Expect opposition – don't be disheartened or swayed by it.  Consider the source.

48. In trying to learn what is going on in your program, don't be afraid to talk and listen to the

lowliest worker.

49. Keep in mind that the boss sets the work pace. The troops will not work harder or longer

than the boss. If the boss is out on the golf course on Saturdays and Sundays, so will the troops.

50. Remember, the Devil is in the details!!

Note: All of these points need amplification. Although listed in absolute terms, each one has its own exceptions--which is point #51. Don't be bound by any hard and fast rule, and don't be too predictable.

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PART II - Twenty·Two More

1. Establish and maintain one, unified organization. Permit no cleavage to develop between headquarters and field components. (Field personnel are part of headquarters, displaced only by geography.)

2. Senior-most individuals in the field should report to the Director, not through an

intermediary. Make it work that way.

3. Senior-most individuals (preferably more) should be sent to the field only after demonstrating effectiveness in headquarters.

4. They should be thoroughly grounded in principles on which the program is structured

- and expected to act from principle.

5. All experience acquired should be codified and used as standards, manuals, procedures, and the like. They operate to:

• provide the building blocks of success.

• conserve and extend the contributions of the best talent.

• avoid repeating mistakes.

• engender discipline.

6. Make contractors do the job for which they are being paid.

7. Use competence of the "customer" organization to elicit, require, or demand performance from the contractor; do not permit "organization" personnel to compensate for contractor weakness.

8. Recognize that most individuals want to "do things", not excluding helping the

contractor.  The incurable “doers” (vs the "causers") should be eliminated; they confirm the contractor in weakness.

9. Foster an environment of constructive technical dialogue; encourage expression of technical dissent.

10. Suppress development of factions within the organization.

11. Insulate the organization from the host department. Protect the organization from being eviscerated by department policies, management theories, directive systems, reporting requirements, and so on.

12. Make selecting and developing outstanding personnel for the organization an objective of transcending importance from the Director on down. Involve key personnel in the

effort. Make high competence a distinguishing attribute of the organization.

13. Recognize the principle of entropy. All systems, measures to introduce order, procedures, management arrangements and the like tend ever toward disorder. Be vigilant to detect and correct wherever evidence of such disorders is found.

14. Require representatives of the Director to operate as just that. Require that they interact with the contractor in that capacity, not dealing with a problem at a low level, when acting at a higher (even top-most) level is appropriate.

15. Assign and define responsibilities, functions, and assignments with clarity. Make sure they are understood.

16. Emphasize formality in all activities and operations.

17. Recognize that all contractor organizations tend toward increasing weakness unless required by external (''customer") management measures to become stronger. Be determined to provide that stimulus.

18. Conserve and protect the talent of contractor organizations against erosion caused by withdrawal of personnel by the parent organization or hiring away by competing contractors within the program.

19. Develop talent in the organization by recruiting widely for outstanding individuals at the entry level. Do not expect they can be acquired from outside at the middle or senior level.

20. Do not be afraid to give large responsibility to young people of promise. Require key managers to attend to their development.

21. Require problems to be described in a "people-identified" manner (statement of problem - person responsible; proposed solution - person pursuing it; support needed - person providing it;) and so forth.

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22. Don't discount small or seemingly meaningless indications of a technical problem. All problems that turn out to be big invariably have precursors.