1970 - Rickover Testimony to Joint Committee on Atomic Energy

On March 19 and 20, 1970, the Joint Committee held hearings in executive session on the naval nuclear propulsion program, at which Admiral Rickover testified on a number of subjects vital to our national

defense. This publication contains the unclassified record of these hearings. These hearings were held to obtain supplemental data for the fiscal year 1971 Atomic Energy Commission request for the naval

reactors development program.

Hearings on naval nuclear propulsion program

Subjects for Admiral Rickover to discuss .

Admiral Rickover's views on problems of national defense.

Navy unable to handle advanced technology.

Naval reactors contributions to commercial nuclear power

Naval nuclear propulsion program

Nuclear carriers

Nuclear frigates

Advance reactor developments

Adequacy of U.S. submarine program

Proposed sale of U.S. nuclear submarines

State Department desires to give nuclear propulsion technology away.

Senator Clinton P. Anderson's statement

Computers fundamental element in modern technology

Operations by Soviet submarines.

Congress opposed to giving U.S. technology away.

Admiral Rickover's " little plaything"

Strong executive branch opposition to foreign assistance.. U.S. assistance entails great risks

State Department proposes "gimmicky" arrangements

No explanation for State Department position_ Export of advanced U.S. computers... How Government handles computer export

Foreign sales by Control Data Corp

No rationale for release of technology

Security of U.S. technical information

Navy controls military technology

Soviet submarine threat. Current Soviet submarine force levels .

Numbers of U.S. submarines

Soviet submarine fleet is modern

United States loses lead in nuclear submarine

Soviets concentrating on ballistic missile submarines

Future U.S. submarine fleet

Soviet submarine production capability

Significant improvement in operating efficiency Soviet submarines capable of high speeds.

Large Russian submarine design effort .

Soviets will surpass U.S. Polaris fleet by 1974.

Defense Department delays U.S. high-speed submarines

Russians possess tremendous submarine construction capacity.

Statement by Senator Henry M. Jackson

High-speed submarine delayed due to low industrial priority.

Defense Department in state of suspended animation_ Admiral Rickover humanizes Navy program_.

Hearings on naval nuclear propulsion program on March 20, 1970

Soviet technology not superior to United States .

Continued delay in high- speed submarine program.

Use of nuclear submarine technology in commercial applications.

Electric drive submarine important to future submarine design.

Delay of high-speed submarine

Status of high-speed submarine design.

Navy unable to get "Brickbat" priority.

DOD delays "Brickbat" request... Delay results in false economy

Setback in new core concept

Advanced test core needed for improved core designs..

Same two development projects delayed last year.

Cost of naval nuclear propulsion program

Reduction in the fiscal year 1971 naval reactor program budget .

Soviets emphasize construction of Polaris-type submarine_ Soviets striving for preeminence at sea

All overseas operations require logistic support

Delayed development projects important to future nuclear warships_-

Mark 48 torpedo program_

No breakthroughs in making submarines smaller and cheaper .

Conclusions on alternate concepts and arrangements

Comparison of Soviet and U.S. submarine designs

Cavitation noise from propellers

Recommmendations for U.S. submarine building program.

Underwater launch missile system

Navy should go underwater as much as they can .

Future Soviet developments unknown..

Status of USS Narwhal

Status of NR- 1

Need for nuclear carriers .

Overseas land airbases

Range of tactical aircraft

There are not enough land airbases

Carriers are mobile airbases...

Bare base kits

Aerial refueling

Survivability of nuclear carriers .

All weapons systems are more vulnerable today Nuclear carriers least vulnerable of all surface ships.

World War II experience

Oil-fired versus all-nuclear task forces

Everything is vulnerable in war

Land air bases are vulnerable

The basic issue

Why the Navy wants CVAN-70 now.

Advantages nuclear propulsion gives carriers.

Tankers to support oil-fired ships are vulnerable.

Proven reliability of naval nuclear propulsion plants- Congress took initiative .

Washington Naval Conference of 1921- Source of information

Naval treaty allowed United States to keep 18 battleships plus carriers

Accuracy of statements by senior officials.

Carrier force level .. Korean War demonstrated need for carriers

No modern carriers in reserve fleet

Major warships authorized since World War II.

Wars using conventional weapons.. JCS recommendation

We will have to fight future wars with what we have.

Attack carrier force level requirements

CVAN-70 needed regardless of force level decisions.

Contributions of systems analysts

Problems in development and manufacture of nuclear components

Major technological advance.. Size of components for Nimitz

Advance procurement funds for Nimitz denied.

Impact of deferring CVAN-70 advance procurement funds.

Status of nuclear frigate construction

Status of DLGN-38 class

Progress toward all-nuclear task forces

Navy goal: nuclear escorts for all nuclear carriers plus some for independent missions_

Present program inadequate.

Initiative of Congress

Nuclear escorts

Disposal of radioactive wastes .

Nuclear fuel for Nimitz

Schedule for CVAN-70

Naval nuclear propulsion component industry

Delays in ordering nuclear components will raise costs.. Substitution of frigate and submarine component work for carrier

component work not practical

Production lines not disrupted

Spare Nimitz class nuclear components.

Capacity of shipbuilder for CVAN-70

Effects of disruption of special Nimitz class production lines

Need for higher standards

Who should control standards to protect the public

Industry cannot police itself

Deficiencies in typical industry codes

Possible legal liability of industry code committees .

Proper roles of industry, government, and the public

Existing industry codes almost impossible to change

Closing remarks..