2011 RAND Lessons from Experience - Vol II: Submarine Program Lessons

This is a Volume 2 of a 4 volume collection of submarine acquisition lessons learned prepared by RAND in 2011. One of the authors was Robert (Bob) Murphy (NRHQ 1971 - 2003) headed the NR Fiscal, Acquisition and Logistics Management Division (08H) from 1999 - 2003).

Volume I: Lessons from the Submarine Programs of the United States, United Kingdom, and Australia

Volume II: Lessons from the U.S. Navy's Ohio, Seawolf, and Virginia Submarine Programs

Volume III: Lessons from the United Kingdom's Astute Submarine Program

Volume IV: Lessons from Australia's Collins Submarine Program

Large, complex submarine design and construction programs demand personnel with unique skills and capabilities supplemented with practical experiences in their areas of expertise. Recognizing the importance of past experiences for successful program management, the governments of the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Commonwealth of Australia asked the RAND Corporation to develop a set of lessons learned from previous submarine programs that could help inform future program managers.

Vol 1 Summary:

In this volume, the authors present an overview of five submarine programs from the three countries — the U.S. Navy's Ohio, Seawolf, and Virginia programs; the UK's Astute program; and Australia's Collins program — and identify lessons that apply to all of them. The lessons were developed through an extensive literature review and numerous interviews with government and private-sector personnel involved in the programs. Among the most important lessons: Ensure the stability of the program; establish the roles and responsibilities of the government and private-sector organizations; develop knowledgeable and experienced managers; and take a long-term, strategic view of the submarine force and the industrial base.

Schank, John F., Frank W. Lacroix, Robert Murphy, Mark V. Arena, and Gordon T. Lee, Learning from Experience: Volume I: Lessons from the Submarine Programs of the United States, United Kingdom, and Australia. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2011. https://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG1128z1.html. Also available in print form.

Vol 2 Summary: (Key Points of Vol 2 are shown after the Volume summaries)

This volume presents lessons from three submarine programs. The RAND team looked at how the programs were managed, the issues that affected management decisions, and the outcomes of those decisions. All three submarine programs had tenuous beginnings. Each experienced cost overruns and schedule delays in the construction of its first-of-class submarine. The Ohio and Virginia programs made corrections, and both are viewed as generally successful. Seawolf, probably due to the changing threat and budgetary environment, was terminated before changes could be made to correct early missteps. An overarching lesson from the three programs is the importance of program stability. Stability applies in many areas — funding consistency, a long-term build strategy, fixed operational requirements, program management, and an integrated partnership between the Navy and the shipbuilders.

Schank, John F., Cesse Cameron Ip, Frank W. Lacroix, Robert Murphy, Mark V. Arena, Kristy N. Kamarck, and Gordon T. Lee, Learning from Experience: Volume II: Lessons from the U.S. Navy's Ohio, Seawolf, and Virginia Submarine Programs. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2011. https://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG1128z2.html. Also available in print form.

Vol 3 Summary:

This volume presents lessons from the UK Astute class. RAND reviewed the history of UK nuclear submarines, investigated how operational requirements were set for the Astute class; explored the acquisition, contracting, design, and build processes that the Astute program employed; and assessed the plans and activities surrounding integrated logistics support for the Astute. The impact of the substantial time gap between the design and build of the Astute and its predecessor nuclear submarines was greatly underestimated by the private sector and the MOD, and both parties underestimated the impact of the MOD's decision to shift responsibilities to the private sector. Designing and building a submarine requires careful management and oversight and a delegation of roles and responsibilities that recognizes which party — the shipbuilder or the government — is best positioned to manage risks.

Schank, John F., Frank W. Lacroix, Robert Murphy, Cesse Cameron Ip, Mark V. Arena, and Gordon T. Lee, Learning from Experience: Volume III: Lessons from the United Kingdom's Astute Submarine Program. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2011. https://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG1128z3.html. Also available in print form.

Vol 4 Summary:

This volume presents lessons learned from its Collins submarine program that could help inform future program managers. Collins was the first submarine built in Australia. RAND investigated how operational requirements were set for the Collins class; explored the acquisition, contracting, design, and build processes that the program employed; and assessed the plans and activities surrounding integrated logistics support for the class. Although Australia had intended to take an evolutionary approach in procuring the Collins class by using an existing design, no design was suitable, so the program pursued a developmental platform and a developmental combat system. This introduced a high degree of risk into the program, particularly in the combat system technology. Among the important lessons: All appropriate organizations should be involved in a new submarine program from its inception, the majority of the design drawings should be completed before construction begins, and a thorough and adequate testing program should be developed. Because designing and building a submarine is one of the most complex undertakings for a new program, they require careful management and oversight.

Schank, John F., Cesse Cameron Ip, Kristy N. Kamarck, Robert Murphy, Mark V. Arena, Frank W. Lacroix, and Gordon T. Lee, Learning from Experience: Volume IV: Lessons from Australia's Collins Submarine Program. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2011. https://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG1128z4.html. Also available in print form.

Volume 2 is definitely worth the read. Key points:

Both SY's had large workforces at the start of the OHIO program in the 1970's and significantly smaller at the end of the program in 1990's as SEAWOLF class was terminated.

All 3 programs had tenuous beginnings with cost overruns and schedule delays with OHIO and VIRGINIA making early corrections and are generally viewed as successes.

Overarching lessons are the importance of program stability:

• Funding consistency

• Long-term build strategy

• Fixed operational requirements

• Strong program management

• Integrated partnership between Navy and shipbuilders

OHIO - detailed discussion starts on PDF page 45

• Overall missile system and overall design were generally conservative and avoided radicle new technologies

• The Integrated logistics approach with KB and Bannfor were designed and built in parallel

• Redundancies were built in with standardized systems  and installed spares

• Benefitted from robust industrial and SY design and construction base

• Benefitted from ample funding 

• Design CPFF with construction FPIF with large spread (inflation protection clause, different over/under run share lines and 152% ceiling) and design as GFE

SEAWOLF - detailed discussion starts on PDF page 77

• Initial concept for affordable and less capable platform set aside for advanced platform that would challenge Soviets

• Priorities were stealth and improved combat capabilities over 688 class but also added in were higher speed, deeper diving, anti-surface, strike, surveillance, and mine warfare

• Required significant technical advances in the reactor, propulsion systems, a new combat system, new hull material

• This departed from previous approaches of limiting technical risk but was deemed necessary

• Construction FPIF with large spread and design as GFE

VIRGINIA - detailed discussion on PDF page 95

• Went back to limiting technical risk

• pursued a design build approach

• Had appropriate level of design complete at construction start

• Had congressional and OSD support

• Went after maximizing modular construction to reduce costs

• Construction CPIF lines added to design contract

• 1992 requirement focus areas (vs SEAWOLF)

• Retain Seawolf quieting

• Maximum flank speed can be reduced provided submarine can operate with other Naval units

• Basic combat system capabilities

• Reduce weapon payload and weapon delivery rate.

• Reduce maximum depth to meet current threat

• Minimize crew complement

TOP LESSONS LEARNED

• Have experienced technical and programmatic leadership at the helm and develop strategies to grow knowledgeable and experienced managerial, oversight, and technical support personnel.

• Take a long-term, strategic view of the submarine force and the industrial base.

• Ensure that the program is adequately supported by the Navy, the government, the scientific community, and the public.

• Ensure that the program is open and transparent to obtain the support of the OSD, Congress, industry,and the public.

• Involve appropriate organizations, commands, and personnel from the beginning.

• Clearly analyze and state system requirements as a mix of key performance requirements and technical standards.

• Understand the current state of technology as it applies to the program and how the platform’s operational requirements affect technology risks and costs.

• Understand that operational requirements must also specify how to test for the achievement of that requirement.

• Have a single integrated design/construction contract with the prime.

• Use a contract structure that has provisions to handle program risks - structure  the contract to hold the contractor responsible for risks under its control (labor rates, productivity, materiel costs, etc.) and hold the Navy responsible for

• Risks beyond the contractor’s control (inflation, changing requirements, changes in law, and so forth).

• Develop a timely and efficient decision making process to minimize and manage changes

• Establish an agreed-upon tracking mechanism and payment schedule.

• Involve builders, maintainers, operators, and the technical community in the design process. - life-cycle costs should be a true design and construction target

• Design for removal and replacement of equipment.

• Complete the majority of the design drawings before the start of construction - target 100% arrangement complete and 80% detailed design complete at construction start

• Conduct a thorough and adequate test program.

• Establish a strategic plan for ILS during the design phase.

• Establish a planning-yard function and develop a maintenance and reliability database.

• Plan for crew training and transition of the fleet

• Controlling risk when introducing new designs is important.

• Submarine design margins must be robust, since they are continually eroded during a particular submarine’s lifetime.

• Submarine design and construction must be a “systems effort.

• Continuous new design work is important to maintain the efficacy of both the Navy nuclear submarine design and engineering talent base.

• Continuous construction work is important to advance construction techniques and to accommodate new materials and systems.

• Appropriate metrics must be established to track progress on cost, schedule, and quality.

• An integrated master schedule must be established, monitored, and executed.

• There must be strong and experienced leadership in both the Navy and the industrial base.